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Appellants Beaver Creek Coal Company and Arco Coal 
Sales Company (for convenience collectively referred to as 
"Beaver Creek") respectfully submit this brief in reply to the 
Brief filed on behalf of respondent Nevada Power Company 
("NPC"). 
SUMMARY OF THE CASE 
This lawsuit involves disputes between Beaver Creek 
and Trail Mountain Coal Company ("Trail Mountain"), two coal 
suppliers, and NPC, a coal consumer. Trail Mountain and Beaver 
Creek each sold coal to NPC under long-term contracts (the 
"Trail Mountain-NPC Contract" and the "Beaver Creek-NPC 
Contract", respectively). In addition, Trail Mountain sold 
coal to Beaver Creek under a long-term contract (the "Beaver 
Creek-Trail Mountain Contract"). The coal sold under each of 
those contracts was intended for use in the boilers at NPC's 
Reid Gardner Station. 
Trail Mountain filed this action against Beaver Creek 
alleging that Beaver Creek breached the Beaver Creek-Trail 
Mountain Contract by refusing to accept Trail Mountain coal. 
Beaver Creek asserts that the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain 
Contract was repudiated and terminated by Trail Mountain's 
failure, after proper demand, to provide adequate assurance 
that its coal would meet the contract's requirement that the 
coal be satisfactory for use at NPC's Reid Gardner Station. 
Beaver Creek contends that it reasonably demanded adequate 
assurance from Trail Mountain based on NPC's representations 
that Trail Mountain coal caused operating problems and, 
therefore, was not satisfactory for use at the Reid Gardner 
Station. 
The issue presently before the Court arose when NPC 
refused to produce to Beaver Creek transcripts of depositions 
of NPC?s officers and employees taken by Trail Mountain in a 
federal court action in which Trail Mountain alleged that NPC 
had breached the Trail Mountain-NPC Contract. Trail Mountain 
Coal Co. v. Nevada Power Co., Civil No. C-84-0686G (the 
"federal action"). NPC contends that the deposition 
transcripts are the work product of its counsel. Beaver Creek 
has appealed from the District Court's order denying Beaver 
Creek's motion to compel production of the deposition 
transcripts. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS ARE RELEVANT 
BECAUSE THIS ACTION AND THE FEDERAL ACTION 
ARISE OUT OF THE SAME FACTS 
Beaver Creek is seeking discovery of the transcripts 
of the depositions taken in the federal action because Beaver 
Creek believes that those deposition transcripts contain 
information relevant to the dispute between the parties to this 
action. Beaver Creek's belief is based on the fact that both 
this action and the federal action arise out of the same facts 
and events. 
NPC suggests in its Brief that this action and the 
federal action are factually dissimilar. NPC attempts to 
distinguish the actions by arguing that at issue in the federal 
action were the Trail Mountain-NPC Contract and the quality of 
the Trail Mountain coal shipped under that contract, but not 
the contract subject to this action. NPC's Brief, p. 6. NPCfs 
argument is meritless. In both the Complaint and Amended 
Complaint filed in the federal action, Trail Mountain alleged 
that the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract had been 
breached. Complaint 1111 46-49 (Appendix 1 to Beaver Creek's 
Brief), Amended Complaint HH 50-52 (Appendix 3 to Beaver 
Creek's Brief). In addition, the facts and events on which 
Trail Mountain's breach of contract claims are based are the 
same in both actions. 
The Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract expressly 
stated that the coal to be sold by Trail Mountain to Beaver 
Creek under that contract would be used by NPC. Because of 
that fact, the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract required 
the coal supplied by Trail Mountain to be "satisfactory for use 
in the coal-fired boilers at Nevada Power Company's Reid 
Gardner Station." 
In December 1983, NPC informed Beaver Creek that coal 
supplied by Beaver Creek to NPC had caused operating problems 
In the federal action pleadings Trail Mountain refers to 
the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract as the "ARCO/NPC 
Contract." Complaint H 12, Amended Complaint 11 15. 
at the Reid Gardner Station. NPC suggested that high sodium 
oxide levels in the coal had caused the operating problems at 
the Reid Gardner Station. Independent analyses of Beaver Creek 
coal demonstrated that it did not contain the levels of sodium 
oxide found by NPC. 
In March 1984, NPC determined that Trail Mountain coal 
contained sodium oxide levels in excess of the maximum 
permitted under the Trail Mountain-NPC Contract. For that 
reason, NPC claimed that Trail Mountain coal was not 
satisfactory for use in its Reid Gardner Station. By letter 
dated March 20, 1984, NPC suspended deliveries under the Trail 
Mountain-NPC Contract. Later, NPC informed Trail Mountain that 
if the quality problems were not resolved by August 1, 1984, 
NPC would consider the Trail Mountain-NPC Contract to be 
terminated. 
NPC informed Beaver Creek that shipments of Trail 
Mountain coal had been suspended by letter dated March 22, 
1984. Based on NPC's representations concerning the problems 
it was having at the Reid Gardner Station and the high levels 
of sodium oxide in Trail Mountain coal, Beaver Creek, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-609, demanded adequate assurance from 
Trail Mountain that its coal was satisfactory for use at NPC's 
Reid Gardner Station as required by the Beaver Creek-Trail 
Mountain Contract. Trail Mountain failed to provide adequate 
assurance. Accordingly, as provided by Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 70A-2-609(4), the Beaver Creek-Trail Mountain Contract was 
repudiated and terminated by Trail Mountain's failure to 
provide adequate assurance. 
In August 1984, Trail Mountain initiated the federal 
action against NPC, alleging that NPC had breached the Trail 
Mountain-NPC Contract by terminating shipments of coal under 
that contract. In the course of that lawsuit, certain officers 
and employees of NPC were deposed. After the depositions were 
taken, NPC moved to dismiss Trail Mountain's Complaint because 
Trail Mountain had not joined in the action Atlantic Richfield 
Company, an indispensable party. Trail Mountain then amended 
its Complaint to state claims against Atlantic Richfield 
Company, the parent company of Beaver Creek and Arco. The 
claims made by Trail Mountain against Atlantic Richfield 
Company in the federal action are the same claims that are made 
against Beaver Creek in this action. The sole reason that 
Trail Mountain's claims against Beaver Creek were not resolved 
in the federal action is that Beaver Creek could not be made a 
party to the federal action without destroying the basis for 
federal jurisdiction. 
There is no basis for NPC's claim that this action and 
the federal action are dissimilar and that the deposition 
testimony given by NPC's officers and employees in the federal 
action is not relevant in this case. In the federal action, 
NPC claimed that it properly terminated the Trail Mountain-NPC 
Contract because the Trail Mountain coal did not satisfy the 
quality requirements of that contract and was not satisfactory 
for use at NPC's Reid Gardner Station. Beaver Creek demanded 
adequate assurance from Trail Mountain based on NPC's 
representations concerning the quality of Trail Mountain coal. 
An important factual issue in both actions is whether the Trail 
Mountain coal was satisfactory for use at NPC?s Reid Gardner 
Station. The parties and the court's time and resources will 
be wasted if Beaver Creek is required to redepose each of the 
NPC witnesses who testified at depositions taken in the federal 
action concerning issues disputed in this action. 
II. DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS ARE NOT WORK PRODUCT 
NPC cites Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S. Ct. 
385 (1947), in support of the proposition that depositions are 
protected work product. The facts and analysis of Hickman 
demonstrate that the Court's ruling in that case did not cover 
depositions and cannot be construed to apply to deposition 
transcripts. Because deposition transcripts are not protected 
by the work product privilege, Beaver Creek is entitled to 
discover the deposition transcripts without demonstrating a 
substantial need for the transcripts under Rule 26(b)(3), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
At issue in Hickman was whether a party could compel 
an opponent to produce notes taken by the opponent's attorney 
during interviews with potential witnesses. The Hickman Court 
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held that the notes were protected from discovery by a 
privilege. The privilege has become known as the work product 
privilege. 
The Hickman Court recognized the privilege in order 
to create a "zone of privacy" in which an attorney can prepare 
a client's case free from the intrusion of opponents. The 
notes at issue in Hickman were within the zone of privacy 
because they contained the mental impressions of the attorney 
who drafted them. The Hickman Court reasoned that requiring 
the notes to be produced would transform the attorney from an 
officer of the court into an ordinary witness. That result was 
unacceptable because it undermined the adversary process on 
which the American system of justice is premised. 
The deposition procedure established by the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure eliminates the threat to the adversary 
process which concerned the Hickman Court. Deposition 
transcripts are verbatim records of testimony given by 
witnesses. The transcripts are prepared by an independent 
officer of the court. As a result, discovery of deposition 
transcripts does not involve an involuntary disclosure of an 
attorney's mental impressions or require the attorney to 
testify concerning the deponent's statements. Instead, the 
deposition process established by the rules of civil procedure 
creates a forum in which attorneys for opposing parties can and 
are expected to exercise their adversarial skills on behalf of 
their clients. Thus, the Hickman analysis affords no 
justification for extending the work product privilege to cover 
deposition transcripts. 
The inapplicability of the work product privilege to 
deposition transcripts is demonstrated further by examining the 
"work product" that NPC claims will be disclosed if the 
deposition transcripts are ordered produced. NPCTs Brief, p. 
11. NPC's claim that its attorney's preparation for the 
deposition will be disclosed is wholly unfounded. Nothing in 
the nature of the deposition process requires an attorney to 
disclose how the attorney prepared for the deposition. If 
NPC's attorney disclosed such information during the 
depositions, he did so voluntarily and in the presence of an 
adversary, thereby waiving any privilege. The questions asked 
during the deposition and the responses given by the witness 
being deposed by Trail Mountain's attorney simply are not work 
product of NPC's attorney, who was merely defending the 
depositions. 
Unlike an attorney's notes of a witness interview, 
deposition transcripts do not evidence an attorney's private 
preparation of a client's case. Thus, there is no need to 
exclude deposition transcripts from discovery to preserve the 
zone of privacy that the Hickman Court recognized to protect 
the adversary process. 
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III. APPLYING THE WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE TO 
DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS WOULD BE FUTILE 
BECAUSE WAIVER IS INHERENT IN THE 
DEPOSITION CONTEXT 
The purpose of the work product privilege is to create 
a zone of privacy in which an attorney can prepare a client's 
case without needless interference. The deposition procedure 
established by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
incompatible with such a zone of privacy. Opposing counsel 
must be given reasonable notice of a deposition and an 
opportunity to participate in the deposition. Since any 
disclosure made by an attorney during a deposition necessarily 
waives any work product privilege because it is made in the 
presence of an adversary, it would be pointless to apply the 
work product privilege to deposition transcripts. 
In its Brief, NPC sought to obscure this compelling 
point by suggesting that Beaver Creek has confused the work 
product and attorney-client privileges. NPC's Brief, pp. 
15-16. To the contrary, NPC has misunderstood Beaver Creek's 
argument and ignored the holdings of the cases it has cited. 
"The purpose of the work product doctrine is to protect 
information against opposing parties . . . ." United States v. 
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980). At the time the depositions were taken, Trail 
Mountain and NPC were opponents. The presence of Trail 
Mountain's counsel at the depositions results in a waiver of 
any work product privilege because Trail Mountain was NPC?s 
adversary in the federal action, not because of a lack of 
confidentiality. NPC now seeks to ignore that Trail Mountain 
was its adversary. The applicability of the work product 
privilege cannot depend on something as capricious as NPCfs 
perception of who its allies are. 
IV. RULE 32(a) ESTABLISHES THAT DEPOSITION 
TRANSCRIPTS ARE DISCOVERABLE 
NPC contends that Beaver Creek is precluded from 
citing and relying on Rule 32(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, in this appeal because Rule 32(a) was not put before 
the trial court. NPCfs Brief, p. 21. The cases cited by NPC 
in support of this proposition demonstrate that the rule of 
preclusion applies only to substantive theories of recovery or 
defenses. Berger v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co., 723 
P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1986) (estoppel defense); Bundy v. Century 
Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984) (theory of 
recovery). Beaver Creek is not introducing a new theory by 
citing Rule 32(a), but instead is merely citing additional 
authority for its argument that deposition transcripts are not 
covered by the work product privilege. Beaver Creek took that 
position before the trial court and continues to assert it in 
this appeal. 
NPC concedes that Rule 32(a) sets forth an evidentiary 
standard for the use of depositions in court proceedings, but 
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argues that the rule does not mean that deposition transcripts 
are discoverable. NPC's Brief, p. 22. NPC's conclusion is 
erroneous. Rule 26(b)(1) expressly authorizes the discovery of 
any matter that "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence." Since Rule 32(a) 
establishes that deposition transcripts are admissible in 
evidence, deposition transcripts must be discoverable under 
Rule 26(b)(1). 
NPC's argument that the deposition transcripts may be 
introduced as evidence at trial, but that they are not 
discoverable is nonsensical. If Beaver Creek cannot obtain the 
deposition transcripts through discovery, it certainly will not 
be able to offer them as evidence under Rule 32(a). The point 
is not that privileged material, if obtained, may be introduced 
as evidence. Instead, the point is that deposition transcripts 
by rule are admissible as evidence and thus are discoverable 
under Rule 26(b)(1). 
V. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
DEFERENCE 
NPC contends that Judge Bunnell's ruling on Beaver 
Creek's motion to compel is presumed to be correct and must be 
affirmed unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion. 
NPC's Brief, p. 10. This standard of review is not applicable 
in this instance because the issue on appeal is one of law, not 
fact. As to rulings on issues of law, the Supreme Court is not 
bound by, nor required to give deference to, the trial court's 
ruling. 
The cases cited by NPC in support of its argument that 
Beaver Creek must demonstrate that the order appealed from is 
an abuse of discretion all fall within the general rule that 
the decision of the trial court is entitled to deference only 
on factual issues. For example, in Tucker Realty, Inc. v. 
Nunley, 16 Utah 2d 97, 396 P.2d 410 (1964), the issue appealed 
was whether the sanction imposed by the trial court for a 
party's failure to respond to an order compelling discovery was 
appropriate. Similarly, both Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 
162 (Utah 1981), and Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 
1974), addressed the adequacy of the evidence to support the 
trial judges' rulings. In such circumstances, deference to the 
trial court's ruling makes great sense because the trial court 
is better situated to assess matters of fact than is an 
appellate court. 
This appeal, however, does not involve a matter of 
fact. Instead, the question presented is whether the trial 
court properly ruled as a matter of law that deposition 
transcripts constitute work product. A trial court has no 
advantage relative to an appellate court in deciding questions 
of law. Thus, on questions of law, this Court is not bound by 
or required to give deference to the trial court's ruling. 
Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 586 n.l (Utah 1982); Provo City 
Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1979). 
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In this appeal, Beaver Creek does not have the burden 
of establishing that the trial court's ruling was an abuse of 
discretion. To the contrary, as the party asserting the 
privilege, NPC bears the burden of demonstrating that an 
exception to the liberal rules of discovery is applicable in 
this instance. Casson Construction Co. v. Armco Steel Corp., 
91 F.R.D. 376, 385 (D. Kan. 1980); Feldman v. Pioneer 
Petroleum, Inc., 87 F.R.D. 86, 88 (W.D. Okla. 1980). 
VI. THE COURT MUST TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE 
OF THE FEDERAL COURT PLEADINGS 
Beaver Creek has provided to the Court and requested 
that the Court take judicial notice of certain pleadings and 
other documents filed by Trail Mountain and NPC in the federal 
action. Beaver Creek is not asking the Court to accept as true 
the allegations contained in those documents, but only to 
accept as true that the allegations were made. These 
allegations frame the factual events relevant to the federal 
action, which are the same as in this matter. This similarity 
is one reason that Beaver Creek seeks copies of the transcripts 
of the depositions taken in the federal action. 
To support its claim that the pleadings and documents 
filed in the federal action are not properly subject to 
judicial notice, NPC relies on 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence § 58 
(1967). Although a superficial reading of the section may 
suggest support for NPCfs contention, a thorough review of the 
section reveals that it is not even relevant to the issue of 
judicial notice in this case. The section NPC cites applies to 
instances where courts are asked to take judicial notice of the 
proceeding or record in another case "to supply, without the 
formal introduction of evidence, facts essential to the 
support of the particular cause before the court." Even if the 
rule stated in American Jurisprudence is correct, it is not 
applicable to this matter. The pleadings and documents filed 
in the federal action do not prove a fact essential to Beaver 
Creek's claims. Instead, those documents merely assist this 
Court in understanding the factual relationship between the two 
actions, which demonstrates that the deposition transcripts 
from the federal action are relevant to this action. 
The scope and reach of judicial notice has been 
expanded over the years. St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th 
Cir. 1979). Contrary to the suggestion of NPC, judicial notice 
now is routinely taken of pleadings and documents filed in 
other actions. 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence IT 201 [03], p. 201-29 (1986) ("Courts are particularly 
apt to take notice of material in court files"); 21 C. Wright & 
K. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure § 5106, p. 505 (1977) 
("The most frequent use of judicial notice of ascertainable 
facts is in noticing the content of court records"). This 
Court recognized in Carter v. Carter, 563 P.2d 177, 178 (Utah 
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1977), that "notice may be taken of the record of another 
case," as long as the court states it has done so, or, 
alternatively, the matter is offered into evidence. Accord, 
Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 
461 U.S. 960, 103 S. Ct. 2436 (1983) ("federal courts may also 
take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts, both 
within and outside of the federal judicial system. . . . " ) ; 
Rothenberg v. Security Management Co., 667 F.2d 958, 961 n.8 
(11th Cir. 1982); St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corp., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1979); 
Sapp v. Wong, 3 Haw. App. 509, 654 P.2d 883, 885-86 n.3 
(1982). As these cases demonstrate, courts will take judicial 
notice of judicial proceedings, even those pending in another 
court. 
NPC also argues that the failure of Beaver Creek to 
seek judicial notice of the documents from the federal action 
before the lower court precludes Beaver Creek from doing so in 
this Court. NPC relies on Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692 
P.2d 754 (Utah 1984); and Berger v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. 
Co., 723 P.2d 388 (Utah 1986). NPC's Brief, p. 20. Those 
cases stand for the accepted rule that a litigant is precluded 
from raising new substantive theories on appeal. Beaver Creek 
is not raising a new theory, but merely submitting information 
which will assist this Court in understanding the similarity 
between this action and the federal action. Moreover, Rule 
201, Utah Rules of Evidence, permits judicial notice of a fact 
to be taken for the first time on appeal. Rule 201(f), Utah 
Committee Note (noting that Utah adopted the federal rule 
verbatim); Rule 201, Federal Rules of Evidence and Advisory 
Committee Note on Subdivision (f); accord, Gustafson v. 
Cornelius Co., 724 F.2d 75, 79 (8th Cir. 1983) ("An appellate 
court may take judicial notice of a fact for the first time on 
appeal."); Coney v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir. 
1984); Green v. Warden, supra; Rothenberg v. Security 
Management Co., supra; Moore v. Estelle, 526 F,2d 690, 694 
(5th Cir.), cert, denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976); 1 J. Weinstein 
& M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence U 201 [06] (1986). 
The provisions of Rule 201 are clear, and under the 
rule the pleadings and documents filed in the federal action 
are properly subject to judicial notice by this Court. Rule 
201(b)(2), defines a fact that may be judicially noticed as one 
that is "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort 
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." 
The documents provided by Beaver Creek were obtained from the 
file maintained by the Clerk of the Court for the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah. Beaver Creek submits 
that the Clerk of the Court of the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah is a source whose accuracy cannot be 
reasonably questioned and from whom the accuracy of the 
documents may be determined accurately and readily. Further, 
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NPC, which executed some of the documents through counsel, does 
not raise any issue as to the authenticity or accuracy of the 
documents. Under these circumstances, Rule 201(d) requires 
this Court to take judicial notice of the documents filed in 
the federal action and the fact that certain allegations were 
made in those documents. In re Ronwin, 139 Ariz. 576, 680 
P.2d 107, 111 n.4 (1983). 
Due to the fact that in their briefs and memoranda to 
this Court, Beaver Creek and NPC have characterized the 
relationship between the federal action and this action 
differently, e.g., Issue No. 2, Answer of Nevada Power 
Company in Opposition to Petition for Permission to Appeal, p. 
5; NPC Brief, p. 6, there also are two compelling pragmatic 
reasons for the Court to take judicial notice of the documents 
from the federal action. First, these documents will enable 
the Court to understand the factual context in which the issue 
before it arose. Second, by taking judicial notice of the 
documents submitted by Beaver Creek, the Court can make its own 
determination as to the similarity of the facts at issue in the 
two cases, as opposed to relying on the unsupported contentions 
of the parties. In taking judicial notice of a complaint filed 
in a state court action, the court in E. I. DuPont De Nemours & 
Co. v. Cullen, 791 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1986), stated that: 
We recognize that no one has formally placed the 
complaint in the record of this case. Yet, we 
see no reason to continue playing Hamlet without 
the prince. Nor do we believe it desirable to 
treat the complaint like Hamlet's father's ghost 
-- exerting an unseen yet controlling influence 
from the limbo of the appendix to the trustee's 
district court brief. 
791 F.2d at 7. This Court likewise should take judicial notice 
of the pleadings and documents filed in the federal action. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in ruling that transcripts of 
depositions taken by Trail Mountain of officers and employees 
of NPC in the federal action which contain testimony concerning 
the factual circumstances out of which this action arose are 
not discoverable by Beaver Creek. Deposition transcripts are 
admissible in evidence at trial. As such, they are within the 
scope of discovery established by Rule 26(b)(1). Deposition 
transcripts are not subject to the work product doctrine. 
Accordingly, Beaver Creek is entitled to discovery of the 
deposition transcripts without making a showing of need. The 
District Court's order must be reversed and an order entered 
compelling NPC to produce the deposition transcripts to Beaver 
Creek. 
DATED this ^<H~day of July, 1987. 
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